ABSTRACT Bitcoin is promoted as decentralized cryptocurrency by using pseudonym to achieve anonymity. Unfortunately, numerous seminal works have demonstrated that Bitcoin only offers weak anonymity in practice. Indeed, the practical technologies of clustering and flow analysis are much effective for tracing Bitcoin transaction and thereby revealing the owner involved. Otherwise said, user's privacy in Bitcoin has been sadly degenerated to be linkable. In this paper, we propose a completely decentralized scheme that can provide full anonymity in Bitcoin. The idea behind the output is to exploit a secure escrow address, which is consensual by all the involved users. The escrow address is generated from the trick of cryptographically secure distributed key generation and can then be used for mixing transactions in Bitcoin. Our protocol is secure against malicious adversaries. The users can jointly perform the protocol and successfully accomplish the transaction without the help of any (trusted) third party and no extra fees. Besides, our proposal is completely compatible with the current Bitcoin architecture.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bitcoin is one of the newest inventions of digital payment system initially proposed in 2008 and has been fully operational in early 2009 [1] . Instead of using central entities (i.e., banks) to establish trust in the currency, Bitcoin stores all transactions in a distributed public ledger, called blockchain, to prevent double spending. It is designed to be an anonymous payment system with no linked information between public keys 1 and individuals who control those public keys, in other words, addresses cannot be linked to their owners. Bitcoin has been paid widespread attention due to this appending property.
However, the anonymity is broken successively. Barber et al. [2] observe that Bitcoin exposes its users to the possible linking of their Bitcoin addresses. Meiklejohn et al. [3] show how to classify Bitcoin addresses that are likely to belong to the same user. They cluster Bitcoin identities into distinct entities, track the flow of their bitcoins [4] , and in some instances manage to de-anonymize them using external information like forum posts where users divulged their Bitcoin identities intentionally. Koshy et al. [5] can even trace Bitcoin addresses to specific IPs. Once one of those transactions is linked to the user's identity, all past and future transactions related to the linked address can be traced, compromising the user's anonymity. Under the circumstances, Bitcoin does not provide true anonymity, although each user can create an arbitrary number of addresses, users' transactions can even be traced to individuals.
To fix the security flaw in Bitcoin, much work has been done and many schemes proposed in the community manage to enhance the property of anonymity. We provide more details in Section V. All the solutions can be viewed as promoting the cryptocurrency in two directions. One direction is to design the schemes from scratch that provide provide stronger anonymity but require advanced cryptography and a lot of changes to Bitcoin architecture, like Zerocoin [6] dand a completely new currency, called Zerocash [7] . Another direction is to construct flexible proposals that are compatible with existing Bitcoin architecture, but they provide weak anonymity(e.g., the third-party could be a vulnerability that might violate users' anonymity).
A. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
We present a completely decentralized protocol that is fully compatible with the Bitcoin architecture. In our context, any user can participate in the process of mixing transaction. We use the trick of Secure Distributed Key Generation [8] to guarantee the property of strong anonymity. The properties of our scheme include the following:
• Strong Anonymity. In our protocol, everyone can only eavesdrop a list of output addresses, but none of them can link the addresses to the related users, even the real participants do not know the corresponding relationships. Importantly, the collection of anonymity is scalable (i.e.,can be easy) to be extended from participants to all Bitcoin users. In previous work, the ownership of bitcoins can be located to participants, therefore an adversary can bind the addresses and their owners with the probability of 1/n, we suppose that there are n participants. But in our protocol, the set of anonymity is flexible for all Bitcoin users.
• No Third Party and Extra Fees. The users can jointly perform the protocol and successfully accomplish the transaction without the help of any third party. In absence of a third party that acts as a service provider, the protocol dose not charge users any additional fees.
• Compatible with Bitcoin. Our scheme is fully compatible with the existing Bitcoin network. It works immediately on top of the Bitcoin network without requiring any change to the Bitcoin rules or scripts.
Organization: In Section II, we review the Bitcoin protocol and Bitcoin mixing. In Sections III, we present the protocol, following security analysis in Section IV. We discuss related work in Section V and conclude our work in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide a basic model of Bitcoin. We focus on the most prevalent approach to strengthen users' anonymity called Bitcoin Mixing. We recapitulate the original model of Bitcoin Mixing and the attacks that users are vulnerable to.
A. BITCOIN ADDRESS
Bitcoin is considered as the best decentralized P2P currency [9] . The Bitcoin network maintains a public ledger, called blockchain, whose purpose is to reach consensus on a set of transactions that have been confirmed. Double spending of bitcoins is prevented as long as the majority of computation power is honest [10] .
Users' accounts in the Bitcoin system are considered as pseudonymous addresses. Technically, an address is the hash of an ECDSA [11] public key. And the user that holds the corresponding private key owns the address and bitcoins in this address. Each user can create any arbitrary number of addresses by creating fresh key pairs [12] . The owner of the address spends the coins using the corresponding private key. In short, a transaction transfers a certain amount of bitcoins from input address to output address signing by input address owner.
Transactions can include multiple input addresses as well as multiple output addresses [13] . In this case, transactions should meet the following requirements: first, the sum of input bitcoins must equal to the sum of output bitcoins; second, the transaction must be signed with the private keys corresponding to all input addresses.
B. BITCOIN MIXING
One prevailing approach to improve anonymity for Bitcoin users is to hide relationships in a group of users by Bitcoin mixing: with the help of a third-party, the users in the group exchange their bitcoins to hide the relations between users and bitcoins from an external observer. Assuming that in a group of several users, every user owns exactly one bitcoin (1 B). In the simplest form, mixing is done with the help of a trusted third-party mixing server. Every user sends a fresh address in encrypted form to the mix and transfers her coins to the mix. Then, the mix decrypts and randomly shuffles the fresh addresses and sends 1 B back to each of them, such public mixes are deployed in practice [14] . However, the users suffer from two severe drawbacks: first, the third-party might steal the bitcoins and never return it to the users; second, the third-party can learn about the relationship between the input address and output address. Thereby, users' anonymity relies on the assumption that the mix does not log or reveal the relation between input and output addresses.
C. BITCOIN MIXING WITH A SINGLE TRANSACTION
Assume that a group of users would like to mix their coins with the help of a third-party. To solve the problem that the third-party can steal the bitcoins, Maxwell proposes CoinJoin [15] : the third-party generates one single mixing transaction containing the users' current addresses as input and the shuffled fresh addresses as output. Recall that a transaction with several input addresses is only valid if it has been signed with all keys belonging to those input addresses. Thus each user can verify whether the generated mixing transaction sends the correct amount of money to her fresh output address; if this is not true the user just refuses to sign the transaction and the protocol aborts without transferring any coins.
III. OUR PROTOCOL
The links between input and output result in the loss of anonymity. We now describe a protocol that removes these links. To ensure verifiability, a group of users jointly create one single mixing transaction and each of them can individually verify that he will not lose bitcoins by checking the transaction. In case of a fraud attempt, the defrauded user can just refuse to sign the transaction. VOLUME 6, 2018 A. SUMMARY OF OUR CONSTRUCTION Our protocol requires three steps. Firstly, the participants execute secure distributed key generation that generates a temporary escrow address T under the control of each participant. They transfer a certain amount of bitcoins to the address T (Section III-B).
Then, each participant uses all participants' encryption keys to create layers of output addresses. They perform a sequential shuffling to obtain a list of output addresses. In addition, the links between address and owner have been completely broken. (Section III-C).
Finally, participants create a transaction to transfer bitcoins from the escrow address T to the ordered output addresses. Each participant checks if her output address is included in the transaction. Then they generate the signature (Section III-D), and the signature key is controlled by every participant. Otherwise the participant can refuse to sign the transaction, the transaction is invalid.
B. GENERATE THE ESCROW ADDRESS
The main purpose of this part is to generate a temporary escrow address T controlled by every participant. The input peers transfer the required bitcoins to T . Without any doubt, bitcoins in T must be protected against stealing by malicious peers. To achieve this, T is generated by using DKG [16] so that T is under joint control by all participants. When transferring bitcoins from T , the peers must collaborate to create a valid signature. This happens to guarantee the bitcoins not to be stolen.
Due to the existing attacks on anonymity, a large number of Bitcoin users would like to break the transaction links, users can participate in the protocol who would like to unlink their bitcoins. We even do not need an anonymous network. The communication between peers can be broadcasted on the Bitcoin network. In this paper, we assume there are n users P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n .
Next we show how to generate the temporary escrow address T and the corresponding key pair using DKG. The private key is used to spend bitcoins in T .
Step 1.Each peer P i selects a random secret z i ∈ Z q and shares it among the n peers using Feldman's verifiable secret sharing (VSS) protocol [17] : 1) P i chooses two random polynomials f i (z), f i (z) over Z q of degree n:
for k = 0, . . . , n. P i computes the shares
. . , n and sends s ij , s ij to peer P j .
2) Each peer P j verifies the shares she received from the other peers. For each i = 1, . . . , n, P j checks if
If fails for an index i, P j broadcasts a complaint against P i .
• received more than n complaints, • answered to a complaint with values that falsify Eq. (1).
Step 2.The distributed secret value x is not explicitly computed by any party. Each peer P i sets her share of the secret as
s ij mod q and the value
s ij mod q.
Step 3.Each peer P i exposes y i mod p via VSS: 1) Each peer P i , broadcasts 
Compute y = n k=1 y i mod p.
Step 4.The n users create an escrow address T from y according to the Bitcoin protocol. Every peer transfers one bitcoin to T . Each peer generates a transaction to transfer bitcoin from their input addresses to T . From the above algorithm, we have obtained an escrow address T and each peer holds a share of secret. Due to the correctness and security of the Protocol DKG, nobody can spend the bitcoins in address T , that insures the bitcoins against being stolen. Only the n peers cooperate with each other can spend the bitcoins in T .
C. ADDRESS SHUFFLING
Each participant generates a fresh ephemeral encryptiondecryption key pair, broadcasts the resulting public encryption key and then creates a fresh bitcoin address, designated to be her output address in the mixing transaction. Then the participants shuffle the freshly generated output addresses in an oblivious manner [18] , similar to a decryption mix network [19] .
In more detail, each participant (say participant P i in a predefined shuffling order) uses the encryption keys of all participants whose index j > i to create a layered encryption of her output address.
Then, the participants perform a sequential shuffling: Starting with P 1 , each participant P i looks forward to receiving i − 1 ciphertexts from P i−1 . Upon reception, each participant strips one layer of encryption from the ciphertexts, adds her own encrypted address and randomly shuffles the result sets.
The participant sends the shuffled set of ciphertexts to the next participant P i+1 . If everybody acts according to the protocol, the decryption performed by the last participant results in a shuffled list of output addresses. The last participant broadcasts this list. FIGURE 1. Overview the address shuffling: First, P 1 uses the encryption keys of P 2 and P 3 to create a layered encryption of her output address; Then P 1 sends the layered address to P 2 , P 2 strips one layer of encryption from the ciphertext, adds her own ciphertext and randomly shuffles the result sets and sends the two ciphertexts to P 3 . Finally, P 3 strips the last layer of encryption from the ciphertexts, adds her own output address and randomly shuffles the result sets, and broadcast the set of output addresses.
As depicted in Fig. 1, we give a detailed account of three participants. By address shuffling, we have obtained a set of output addresses, The last participant has broadcasted the result, each participant checks if her output address is included in the result. If not, she can collaborate with other participants to reveal the dishonest participant and exclude him. The rest of participants can re-perform the protocol.
D. GENERATE A SINGLE TRANSACTION
As depicted in Table 1 , all participants generate a valid transaction. Only they cooperate with each other can they create a The transaction transfers n bitcoins from T to the list of output addresses. After having checked the transaction, participants use their own share of the secret value x to sign the transaction. They cooperate with each other to provide a valid signature corresponding to T .
valid signature. The specific steps are as follows:
Step 1. Participants generate a transaction transfer n B from the escrow address T to the list of output addresses Step 2. Each participant P i verifies if her address is included in the transaction and checks the amount of bitcoins. If validation fails, P i can refuse to sign the transaction, the transaction is invalid.
Step 3. Each participant P i collaborates with each other by using their own share of secret x i to generate a valid signature.
Step 4. They broadcast the transaction to the Bitcoin network.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze our protocol in terms of the anonymity of Bitcoin and system properties.
A. ANONYMITY
Our protocol strengthens the anonymity of users. Besides the advantages that the previous work has mentioned, we extend the set of anonymity. In detail, we assume that there are n participants, generally, the set of anonymity is n, and adversaries have the probability of 1/n to guess the relationships between addresses and owners correctly. But in our protocol we enlarge the anonymity set from n to all Bitcoin users. If the anonymity set is large, to the eavesdropper, the probability of failing in finding the links will be high, which can enhance the anonymity.
1) UNLINKABILITY
Unlinkability and randomness depend on DKG and address shuffling. The specific correctness and security are guaranteed by the origin protocols. First, all participants generate a temporary escrow address together and transfer some bitcoins to the address. Then, we shuffle the output addresses and the shuffling is random. Combining the above-mentioned two respects, we can only know the set of output addresses but no one can correspond with the input addresses.
2) DENIABILITY
In previous works, most protocols cannot achieve deniability, that is to say users can deny that she has participated in the protocol. But in our protocol, after the transaction has been confirmed, all bitcoin users can only see a set of output VOLUME 6, 2018 addresses, and no one knows the addresses belong to which owner. So any participant can plausibly deny having participated in a mixing and nobody can relate to their identification.
3) BALANCE
The protocol should not be exploited to print new bitcoins or steal bitcoins, even when participants collude. At first, all participants transfer one bitcoin to the escrow address T . The bitcoins in T is locked unless all participants collaborate with each other to create a valid signature. This guarantees that nobody can steel the bicoins in T .
4) LOW RISKS
A malicious participant may disrupt the transaction. In our protocol, we reduce the occurrence of this issue. At first, we have asked participants to transfer their bitcoins, if they behave dishonest, their own bitcoins will be lost.
B. SYSTEM PROPERTIES 1) COMPATIBILITY
The participants first generate temporary escrow address together. They can execute DKG and communicate with each other locally. They sign the transaction jointly using their own share of private key. Bitcoin system is not concerned how the signature is performed as long as the signature is valid and the transaction is in the correct form. Then they submit the transaction exactly the same as existing Bitcoin system. Miners cannot distinguish whether the signature is generated by a single signer or by a group of signers. Thus, our protocol is fully compatible with the current Bitcoin system.
2) NO MIXING FEES
Our protocol does not need any third party, all participants cooperate with each other to execute the protocol. So besides basic transaction fees, they need not any extra fees.
3) DOS AND SYBIL PROTECTION
Our protocol uses transaction fees to resist the Dos and Sybil attacks. Every Bitcoin transaction can include a transaction fee that is paid to the Bitcoin miner who confirms the transaction on the blockchain. Besides, all participants must transfer their bitcoins to T firstly, which makes it expensive for an adversary to harm the system.
V. RELATED WORK
To enhance the anonymity of Bitcoin users, all solutions can be divided into two aspects: One is to design the schemes from scratch that provide stronger anonymity but require advanced cryptography and a lot of changes to Bitcoin system. A new concept called Zerocoin [6] was proposed. It was developed based on zero knowledge [20] mechanism. However, the size of the proof stored in the blockchain for each transaction is extremely large (25KB) and far exceeds the size of the Bitcoin transaction itself. Recently, there have been some proposals [21] , [22] to reduce the size of Zerocoin proof. Zerocash [7] has significantly reduced the size to 1KB.
The other is to construct flexible proposals that are compatible with existing Bitcoin system. The idea of CoinJoin [15] is to create a single transaction, and the transaction is signed by all input peers. CoinSwap is proposed by Maxwell [23] . It enables those participants to create reliable transactions by providing a guarantee that each participant cannot steal the fund. But it needs a third party and requires extra fees. Monero [24] enhances the anonymity based on linkable ring signature [25] . CoinShuffle [26] , like CoinJoin, uses group transactions to ensure correctness. CoinShuffle improves over CoinJoin by using decryption mixnets for address shuffling which achieves anonymity against insiders.
Compared to the related work, we introduce several improvements. Firstly, we provide stronger anonymity and extend the anonymity set to all Bitcoin users instead of the set of group participant. Second, we improve the success rate of protocol. Users transfer their bitcoins at first, if they behave dishonestly during the protocol, their own bitcoins will lost. Finally, we do not need any third party and extra fees.
VI. CONCLUSION
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